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Abstract: Although consortia in the aviation sector predate deregulation by 
decades, this type of cooperative agreement, particularly in the airline industry, 
is experiencing a resurgence of interest from industry participants and 
academia. Airlines are searching for new innovative ways to reduce costs while 
airports are searching for private partners to improve terminal facilities and 
equipment and update services. Passengers, on the other hand, continue to 
balance price versus performance in their travel experience. This empirical 
research study finds evidence of positive influences of airline consortia to all 
key stakeholders; however the majority of benefit appears to be felt by the 
airlines and the associated airport. It is still unclear how much benefit is passed 
on to the passenger. Regardless, research results clear a path for a better 
understanding of the positive results of consortia in this turbulent industry. 
Keywords: aviation; consortia; airline-airport consortiums; airlines; airports; 
inter-organisational cooperation; partnerships; stakeholder benefits; strategic 
alliances; co-opetition. 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Tinoco, J.K. and  
Sherman, B.W. (2014) ‘Something old is new again: airline-airport consortia 
and key stakeholder benefits’, World Review of Intermodal Transportation 
Research, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.1–17. 
Biographical notes: Janet K. Tinoco received her PhD from the University of 
Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA. She is an Assistant Professor of Marketing 
and Management in the Department of Management, Marketing and Operations 
in the College of Business, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona 
Beach, FL. Her areas of teaching include strategy, leadership and sustainability 
while her research centres on innovation, sustainability and strategy in high 
technology industries. She also holds a Master in International Business and a 
Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering. Her work has appeared  
in the Journal of Organizational Culture, Conflict and Communication 
(forthcoming); Journal of Aviation and Aerospace Perspectives; International 
Journal of Management and Innovation; World Review of Intermodal 
Transportation Research, International Journal of Sustainable Strategic 
Management and World Review of Science, Technology and Sustainable 
Development. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   2 J.K. Tinoco and B.W. Sherman    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Brian W. Sherman graduated from the College of Business at Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University with his MBA, concentration in Finance. He also holds 
a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Political Science. 
This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘Something old 
is new again: airline-airport consortia and key stakeholder benefits’ presented 
at 54th Annual Transportation Research Forum, Annapolis, Maryland, USA, 
21–23 March 2013. 
 
1 Introduction 
Consortia have existed for many years, particularly in industries where advances in 
research and technology are critical for firm survival and industry profitability. While not 
new to the aviation sector, consortia, specifically those involving airlines and airports, 
have remained relatively unnoticed as a viable business solution for this challenging 
industry. These types of airline and airport consortia were in existent prior to industry 
deregulation, but were few and far between. However, there is growing evidence that the 
industry is turning its attention more and more to this form of inter-organisational 
relationship to combat costs and increase efficiencies. 
Airline-airport consortia, formed in cooperation with the airports are “a group of 
airlines that join together to hold responsibility in common for operation and maintenance 
of facilities, equipment, and/or services at an individual airport, as delegated by 
agreement with airport management” [Transportation Research Board, (2011), p.1]. 
These consortia have shown to be very flexible and adaptive, depending on the changing 
needs of participating airlines and the capabilities of the airport. 
Due to the success of this type of inter-organisational relationship, the number of 
these arrangements appears to be growing (Transportation Research Board, 2011). Yet 
despite the apparent success and increasing popularity, there is little empirical research 
that examines the attained benefits of airline consortia, particularly from multiple 
perspectives of the key stakeholders. We define these key stakeholders in our research  
as the airlines, the airports and the passengers. Previous work compiled in ACRP 
Synthesis 31 by the Transportation Research Board assessed the governance structure of 
airline-airport consortia in the USA, the roles and responsibilities of selected consortiums 
and the benefits for the organisations involved. This research will build on those efforts 
and will also explore both financial and non-financial passenger benefits. 
While there is extensive research in the areas of the formation and definitions of 
strategic alliances (c.f., Schermerhorn, 1975; Nielsen, 1988) and also a significant 
amount of research applying those theories to code-sharing alliances in aviation 
(Brueckner, 2001; Rajasekar and Fouts, 2009), there is limited research focusing on 
consortia in general (Evan and Olk, 1990; Grotnes, 2008) and much less within the airline 
industry. Furthermore, most of the research that has been done on inter-firm cooperation 
and strategic alliances centres on the pre-existing inter-firm environment and a sparse few 
have attempted to focus on the direct costs (Wang, 2010) and benefits (Gudmundsson, 
1999) to the consumer beyond the basics of economic competition. 
As such, the inherent goal of this study is to fill this void and evaluate the  
cost-effectiveness and non-cost benefits. It is important for the industry, academia and the 
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government to understand and address the true impact of these arrangements on the key 
stakeholders involved: airports, passengers and the airlines themselves. The questions to 
be asked include: What are the cost savings associated with the airline consortia? What 
other benefits may be realised by consortium members? What are the advantages for the 
airports and what cost benefits do they realise? Finally, do cost savings and increased 
efficiencies for the airlines and airports ultimately transfer to the passenger? How do 
these consortia impact the passenger, if at all? This empirical study examines existing 
airline consortia, primarily in the USA and their benefits via a survey-based data 
collection effort. 
With this backdrop, this research paper first presents a review of cooperative  
inter-organisational relationships and their benefits, particularly with relevance to the 
airline industry and consortia. Second, we discuss our survey research method and initial 
findings. Finally, we discuss implications for the key stakeholders and future research. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Inter-organisational cooperative agreements 
Across all industries, inter-organisational cooperation between firms can take many 
forms. Inter-organisational cooperation may be defined as the presence of deliberate 
relations between otherwise autonomous organisations for the joint accomplishment  
of individual operating goals (Schermerhorn, 1975). For our purposes the most  
important part of this definition is the ‘deliberate relations’ between organisations. This 
understanding is necessary to discern passive, tacit collusion from more active and formal 
organisational structures. Tacit collusion, as a part of game theory, does play a major role 
within inter-firm cooperation (Parkhe, 1991); however, the more formal and active forms 
of inter-organisational cooperation are the primary concern of this paper. The qualities of 
these types of cooperative structures have been addressed by Schermerhorn (1975), 
Nielsen (1988), as well as Koh and Venkatraman (1991). Each author further places the 
qualities of these structures into different categories to serve the objectives of their 
specific goals. In this research we discuss strategic alliances, joint ventures and consortia 
with emphasis placed on the latter. 
Strategic alliances are the “relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative arrangements, 
involving flows and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures from 
autonomous organizations, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals linked to the 
corporate mission of each sponsoring firm” [Parkhe, (1991), p.581]. Moreover, firms 
pursue cooperative agreements in order to “gain fast access to new technologies or new 
markets, to benefit from economies of scale in joint research and/or production, to tap 
into sources of know-how, and to share risks for activities that are beyond the scope of a 
single organization” [Powell, (1990), p.315]. Axelrod (1984) offers that pooling 
resources and responding to threats are two conventional reasons for establishing 
cooperative efforts. 
Furthermore, alliances fundamentally possess the shared feature of ongoing mutual 
interdependence, the situation that arises when one party is vulnerable to another whose 
behaviour is not controlled by the first (Parkhe, 1993). For our purposes, a strategic 
alliance is any arrangement between two companies that have decided to share resources 
to undertake a specific, mutually beneficial project. In a strategic alliance, companies 
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must have compatible goals, clearly defined strategies, sound relationships and 
willingness to blend cultures (Walters et al., 1994). As an ‘umbrella term’ it contains the 
subcategories of all other formal structures of inter-firm cooperation such as license 
agreements, joint ventures and consortia. However, a joint venture is unique in that it 
involves a legal entity, created by two or more companies (Anonymous, 1998). The 
sharing of costs and risks associated with joint venture formation allows firms to gain 
access to new markets and encourage innovation. 
van de Ven (1976) examined the relationships among organisations linked together as 
an action system to solve problems and attain joint goals and suggested an optimal level 
of interdependence for cooperation depending on commonalities and incentives. Yet, this 
analysis was done over a broad theoretical lens of resource dependency theory that 
focused on public-sector organisations and local human service organisations and not 
among competing enterprises (van de Ven, 1976). Dai (2010) adds that the challenges 
confronted by organisations suggest a growing need to sustain profitability through 
cooperation and examined the governance structures that facilitate cooperation. It has 
also been suggested that competitive advantages erode rapidly in many industries and 
deregulation along with new technology is dramatically reducing the barriers to entry 
(Hammel and Breen, 2007). This is especially true for the airline industry, emphasising 
the effects of deregulation in 1978 as well as the tremendous effect that e-commerce has 
had on changing the way airlines and consumers interact. 
This leads us to the introduction of the consortium model which forms the conceptual 
foundation of airline-airport consortia agreements. What is a consortium and how does it 
differ from the strategic alliances and joint ventures discussed above? “Consortia 
typically involve two or more competing companies pooling their resources to create a 
new legal entity to conduct operations. They include substantial member-company 
contributions of capital, technology, and other assets; they do not include the merging of 
the members” [Evan and Olk, (1990), p.37]. This definition was written in reference to 
research and development consortia as a new organisational form following the 1984 
revision of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. An alternative definition is as follows: “A 
consortium is an informal alliance of firms and organizations that is financed by 
membership fees for the purpose of coordinating technological and development 
activities” [Hawkins, (1999), p.161]. This definition was written in regards to 
standardisation consortia within the IT industry. As noted, the major difference between 
these definitions is the role of legal formality and the payment of fees to acquire 
membership. Within the subject context, airline consortia, formed in cooperation with the 
airports are “a group of airlines that join together to hold responsibility in common for 
operation and maintenance of facilities, equipment, and/or services at an individual 
airport, as delegated by agreement with airport management” [Transportation Research 
Board, (2011), p.1]. 
2.2 Cooperation and stakeholder benefits 
As mentioned above, we define the key stakeholders in our research on airline-airport 
consortiums as the airlines, the airport and the passengers. Most of the literature written 
on the benefits to stakeholders involved with regarding competing firms within the 
relationship, often pursuing primary reasons for cooperative behaviour. 
It is important to note that most of the studies mentioned above focus on general 
inter-organisational behaviour and not the special case of co-opetition that is present in 
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most aviation related endeavours. In a study by Kotzab and Teller (2003), the authors 
investigate and analyse how competing grocery producers in Europe adopted 
collaborative techniques in order to adapt to a dynamic and competitive market. These 
collaborative methods manifested in two categories: simple dyadic value-added 
partnerships and more “sophisticated forms of co-opetition1 where supply chain members 
have both relationship types – competition and cooperation – at the same time” [Kotzab 
and Teller, (2003), p.268]. Furthermore, these cooperative models were evaluated in the 
context of the European efficient consumer response (ECR) initiative, a customer-
oriented supply-chain management strategy. The authors emphasise that ECR allows 
certain synergies and harmonisation that can help avoid duplication costs and improve 
service and efficiency. “This results in win-win-win situations, where all partners within 
the supply chain (producers, retailers, and end users) can profitability by doing more with 
less” [Kotzab and Teller, (2003), p.271]. 
Another good example of cooperation among competitors utilising this model is the 
foundation of the SEMATECH consortium between fourteen competitors within the US 
semiconductor industry in 1987. The example of the SEMATECH consortium is greatly 
relevant to the US airline industry because “it offers insight into how cooperation can 
arise and persist in a highly competitive industry” [Browning et al., (1995), p.114]. It was 
also added that by pooling together resources, US semiconductor firms were able to  
re-establish their supply and materials infrastructure that had suffered due to loss of 
market share to Japanese manufacturers; this is something that no US firm could have 
achieved independently (Browning et al., 1995). Interestingly, Browning et al. (1995) 
make no reference to the effects of the SEMATECH cooperation on consumers, instead 
focusing strictly on the formation of the consortium. 
Ketchen et al. (2004) offer that firms seek efficiencies through economies of scale 
and scope while simultaneously pursuing differentiation to remain competitive and gain 
market share; thus cooperating on the supply-side of business which is less visible to 
consumers. Also, although tensions may exist in ‘cooperative’ efforts, managers “should 
understand that cooperation and competition can exist simultaneously and both can 
contribute to achieving organizational goals” [Ketchen et al., (2004), p.787]. 
Looking across the industries and types of agreements mentioned above, there are 
tangible benefits to those firms cooperating with one another (gaining economies of 
scale; sharing of resources, risk and knowledge; entering new markets) while benefits to 
the end user or consumer are less apparent and, but we believe do exist. We now turn our 
attention to alliances, joint ventures and consortia in aviation and their potential benefits 
to our subject stakeholders. 
2.3 Cooperation in aviation 
In the aviation industry, co-opetition exists largely in the form of strategic alliances and 
joint ventures. With respect to global airline alliances, SkyTeam, Oneworld and Star 
Alliance are all examples of strategic alliances that operate under license agreements. 
However, the size and expansion of these once-simple code sharing agreements have led 
to the hybrid development of new organisations to manage operations. Thus, these 
alliances lend themselves closer to joint ventures which result in the creation of a new 
organisation that is formally independent of the parents (Borys, 1989). 
Beyond simple code shares and more complex alliances, several airlines have created 
joint ventures to form new airlines. For example, recently Qantas and China Eastern 
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Airlines have agreed to set up Jetstar Hong Kong, a new low-cost carrier in Hong Kong 
that will be launched in 2013 (Toh, 2012). Another prime example of airline co-opetition 
is Spairliners, a joint venture between Air France/KLM E&M and Lufthansa Technik 
which specialises in component availability for the Airbus A380 and Embraer regional 
jets. 
Joint ventures are especially popular amongst engine manufacturers. For example, 
CFM International (CFMI) is a joint venture between General Electric and Snecma. 
International Aero Engines (IAE) is a joint venture involving Pratt & Whitney,  
Rolls-Royce, Daimler-Benz, Fiat and Japan Aero Engines. In addition, the Engine 
Alliance (EA) is a 50/50 joint venture between GE Aircraft Engines and Pratt & Whitney 
to develop, manufacture, sell and support a new modern technology engines for the next 
generation of high capacity, long range aircraft (Engine Alliance, 2013). These joint 
ventures not only pool technological knowledge, reduce risk and lower production and 
development costs for individual manufacturers but also create an interesting situation 
where manufacturers can be both partners and competitors concurrently. 
The formation and growth of the airline-airport consortium model mirrors this 
growing trend of cooperation within the aviation industry as a whole. While consortia 
have existed in various forms for many years in other industries, airline and  
airline-airport consortia are relatively new forms of inter-organisational cooperation in 
the aviation industry, featuring distinguishing characteristics from other forms of 
cooperation that have existed in this industry in past years. In this form, airline and 
airline-airport consortia cooperate on the ‘invisible’ logistics side of operation while still 
competing in the ‘visible’ marketing and revenue-gaining arenas [Kotzab and Teller, 
(2003), p.271]. It is a type of value-added partnership where all partners can achieve 
value creation by outsourcing for competitive advantage. These consortia offer promising 
benefits to airlines, airports and other stakeholders and also offer strong insight into the 
nature of strategic alliances and inter-firm cooperation. 
The roots of the consortium model in the airline industry can be traced to the 1960s in 
the US and Europe. However, it was not until the 1980s when this model became a 
popular arrangement as both airlines and airports look for innovative solutions to combat 
rising costs and the need for efficiencies. The following paragraphs highlight a selection 
of consortia, illustrating their history, diversity and staying power. 
In the 1960s, two consortia were established by European airlines to share and 
coordinate expensive manufacturing and maintenance facilities. KSSU (an acronym of its 
founders KLM, SAS, Swissair and UTA) was created by its founders to provide 
cooperative maintenance for common aircraft types by sharing heavy maintenance 
responsibilities. “There was no duplication of buildings or equipment and substantial 
savings were made” [Iatrou and Oretti, (2007), p.69]. Similarly, Atlas was founded in 
1968 by Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa and Sabena. A tangible result of these two 
consortiums was the development of two main aviation kitchens, or galleys, that have 
been adopted by airlines around the world. 
In 1969, 12 airlines that operated within Hawaii formed the Airlines Committee of 
Hawaii (ACH), a separate legal entity that took responsibility for building an off-site 
fuelling facility as well as the contracting of construction and fuelling services (Weaver 
et al., 2009). The ACH is an example of fuel consortium where competing airlines 
cooperate by pooling together resources to benefit from the cost savings of having a 
fuelling facility close to airport operations. 
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There is no evidence of the fuel consortium model being implemented anywhere in 
the world immediately following the development of the ACH. However, as  
de-regulation was being planned and enacted in the USA, airlines were already  
looking for cost reduction strategies in the new era of commercial air transport. In the 
early-mid 1980s, United Airlines, led by Robert Sturtz, began implementing fuel 
consortiums at several key airport locations; the first of which were Chicago, Honolulu 
and Anchorage, followed by Phoenix, Seattle, Las Vegas and Los Angeles (Sturtz and 
Smith, 2010). 
Airline-airport consortia that manage terminal facilities and equipment (TF/E) share a 
similar timeline to their fuel consortium counterparts. Atlanta Airlines Terminal 
Corporation was founded in 1979, followed by CICA Terminal Equipment Consortium in 
Chicago in 1990, Terminal One Group Association of JFK in 1994, Detroit  
North Terminal Consortium in 2008 (Transportation Research Board, 2011) and most 
recently, the Portland Airlines Consortium in 2010 (PAC, 2011). The continued 
formation of these cooperative organisations should continue well into the future as 
airlines become more familiar with each other’s operations and maintain an open 
communications network. 
The technical and legal characteristics of each consortium noted above are unique and 
context-specific but the reasons for their creation and endurance are universal: the 
benefits outweigh the costs and risks associated with consortium membership. Slowly 
growing in popularity, the consortium model allows airlines to seek shelter and find 
protection from the increasingly volatile industry by pooling together with airports to 
achieve common goals. Over time, the unique challenges faced by airlines in different 
markets have given way to the formation of consortiums, both domestic and international, 
that are unique to that specific cause or geographic location. 
Past research indicates that consortiums have been formed for a myriad of reasons, 
ranging from fuel farm scheduling, storage, distribution and inventory to terminal 
facilities (construct, clean, maintain) and baggage handling and inspection. Airport 
utilities, de-icing/anti-icing, snow removal services, retail/food/beverage concessions, 
gate scheduling, ramp control and operations and airline passenger services are common 
airline consortium responsibilities but these can vary substantially between different 
airport locations (Transportation Research Board, 2011). Regardless of whether the 
consortium is created for fuel management or associated with an airport’s terminal 
facilities, our research indicates that the benefits for the airlines and the airports centre on 
efficiencies gained and cost reductions, as well as improvements in safety. As 
demonstrated by Martin and Voltes-Dorta (2008), the large number of airport 
stakeholders (airlines, passengers, policymakers, regional planners, etc.) makes it crucial 
to understand their costs and potential cost savings through economies of scale. As for 
passengers, we suggest that airline and airport costs savings impact the passenger in 
terms of reduced facility charges, airline tickets and baggage fees. Improved operational 
efficiencies should also result in increased passenger safety, improvement in baggage 
handling and reductions in lost or mishandled luggage. Moreover, a significant potential 
benefit of airline-airport consortia is an improvement of on-time flights through the 
reduction of turn-around and taxi-out times. As stressed by Truong (2011) and Atkin  
et al. (2010) flight delays are a critical problem for the air transport industry with early 
delays having a cascading effect on total airport operations. 
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3 Methodology 
Significant effort was spent in searching available secondary data to understand the 
benefits of current and past airline-airport consortia. However, a severe absence of 
complete and pertinent information limited the potential for secondary analysis. This 
obstruction was manifest twofold: from a lack of strategy disclosure on behalf of 
cooperating airlines and also from a lack of relevant information from all airport 
locations where a consortium is presently operating. For example, lost baggage 
information is not reported on an airport basis but rather by each individual airline, 
making it nearly impossible to compare airports with relevant consortia solely on lost 
baggage rates. In regards to these consortia as a part of airlines’ long-term strategic 
planning, the overwhelming majority of airlines involved in a consortium make no 
mention of such membership in their respective annual reports. Furthermore, no data 
were available on relevant consortia agreements that had expired or were terminated. 
Due to this lack of secondary data in published research, cross-sectional research via 
a self-administered questionnaire was chosen as the most appropriate avenue for this 
study. This type of survey research attempts to provide an accurate representation of 
reality through the single administration of a research instrument (Churchill, 1999). The 
questionnaire was created based on several key sources, including ACRP Synthesis 31, 
available literature on airline consortia, a review of inter-organisational cooperative 
agreement benefits and a review of relevant aviation research regarding passenger 
service, airport services and airline performance indicators. As such, questions were 
developed investigating the primary reason(s) for consortium formation, the duties and 
responsibilities of the consortium and the possible benefits of the consortium in terms of 
airline operations (efficiency, safety, costs); airport operations (efficiency, safety, costs); 
and passengers services (passenger facility charges, prices, baggage, on-time departures, 
safety, passenger experience). Additionally, questions on consortia expansion 
expectations, annual budgets, membership fees and applicability of the business model to 
other situations were also asked. 
Although ACRP Synthesis 31 was conducted on the basis of three types of airline-
airport consortia (fuel, terminal and equipment), for this study it was determined that  
the terminal and equipment consortia were similar in nature and did not warrant  
exclusive categories. Narrowed down to two types of consortia (fuel and terminal 
facilities/equipment), each survey contained two possible sets of questions (that is, in 
effect, two surveys in one mailing): one set of questions for fuel consortia and one set of 
questions for TF/E. A draft questionnaire was reviewed by three aviation research 
academics for clarity and accuracy and revised accordingly. Elements from Bagozzi 
(1996), Dillman et al. (2009) and Cycyota and Harrison (2006) were employed for 
questionnaire construction and implementation. 
To maximise the number of potential responses, an exhaustive search was conducted 
to identify all airline-airport consortiums operating in the US and Canada, resulting in the 
identification of 75 consortiums from 63 different airport locations. From this population, 
18 consortiums were excluded from the survey as there was no contact information or 
address available. Based on those 57 consortiums, an additional search was made to 
identify individuals employed by an airline, airport, airport services operator or 
consortium operator that could be directly connected with those specific consortiums. 
This search produced 106 individuals that were subsequently contacted and sent the 
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questionnaire. The employment positions of survey participants included ground service 
station managers, airport directors and deputy directors, consortium directors and airline 
managers and senior managers. 
Survey participants were contacted via a three-wailing mailing either through the US 
Postal Service (USPS) or by e-mail as suggested by Dillman et al. (2009). For all 
respondents where USPS addresses were known, a letter was sent explaining a 
forthcoming survey. Next, a letter with the survey was sent, followed by a postcard 
reminder a week later. Similarly, for all respondents where only e-mail addresses were 
known, individuals were contacted three times with an invitation to take the survey. In 
both cases, for response rate improvement we offered to send them a copy of the results 
of the research, if requested and to donate to the National Business Aviation Association 
(NBAA) Corporate Angel Network if they completed and returned the survey. Using this 
procedure, five surveys were returned as undeliverable; three of these five respondents 
were then contacted by e-mail for an effective sample size of 104. Twenty-eight surveys 
were completed of which one survey was removed due to excessive absence of data. As 
such, the response rate was 25.9%. It is highlighted that five of the 27 remaining surveys 
responded to questions for both fuel consortia and to TF/E consortia. 
4 Results and analysis 
The responses received from the survey have both confirmed the overall positive 
perspective on these organisations, in addition to providing specific insights about how a 
consortium and its members achieve benefits. From the 27 responses that were received, 
12 were from airport staff, ten from consortia staff, six from airport service operators and 
one from an airline representative (two respondents selected multiple affiliations). 
Additionally, of the responses received, 21 pertained to fuel consortia while 12 pertained 
to TF/E consortia (five recipients filled out both sections). The respondents were also 
asked to express their familiarity with the consortium(s) at their airport location;  
14 expressed that they were ‘very familiar’, eight said they were ‘familiar’ and five 
admitted to being ‘somewhat familiar’ to the consortium at their airport. 
To confirm the results found in ACRP Synthesis 31, respondents were then asked to 
rank the primary reason for consortia formation from a pre-determined list. The following 
overall rankings were calculated using a weighted-average of the indicated rankings. 
Despite some small differences between the two types of consortia, the overall pattern is 
more or less the same as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Primary reason for consortium formation 
Reason for formation Fuel consortia TF/E consortia 
Manage, maintain, operate common facilities 1 2 
Reduce costs 2 1 
Improve efficiency 3 3 
Develop, finance, construct facilities 4 5 
Increase vendor competition 6 6 
Improved airline representation 5 4 
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Using a five-point Likert scale where a score of one represents ‘strongly disagree’ and a 
score of five represents ‘strongly agree’, the corresponding averages and associated 
standard deviations were calculated for the topics included in Tables 2 and 3 for both fuel 
and TF/E consortiums. For both consortia types, the respondents have confirmed the 
presumptions of the benefits to airlines and airports, with the most positive consideration 
given to airlines. In addition, respondents indicated specific reasons how stakeholders 
particularly benefit from these consortia. 
Table 2 Survey response scores on fuel consortium effects 
 Average rating (out of five) 
Standard 
deviation 
Percent agree or 
strongly agree 
Airline operations    
 Increase efficiency 4.23 0.65 88% 
 Reduce safety 3.92 0.84 69% 
 Reduce costs 4.15 0.67 85% 
Airport operations    
 Increase efficiency 4.19 0.67 85% 
 Reduce safety 4.04 0.77 81% 
 Reduce costs 4.08 0.80 73% 
Passenger services    
 Decrease passenger facility charges 2.96 1.04 27% 
 Decrease ticket prices 3.04 0.96 38% 
 Increase aircraft turn-around-times 3.50 0.65 50% 
 Increase passenger safety 3.12 0.77 27% 
 Increase passenger experience 3.08 0.63 15% 
Table 3 Survey response scores on terminal facility and equipment consortium effects 
 Average rating (out of five) 
Standard 
deviation 
Percent agree or 
strongly agree 
Airline operations    
 Increase efficiency 4.22 0.94 78% 
 Increase safety 3.72 1.07 50% 
 Reduce costs 4.28 0.83 78% 
Airport operations    
 Increase efficiency 4.39 0.78 83% 
 Increase safety 3.72 1.13 44% 
 Reduce costs 4.06 1.00 67% 
Passenger services    
 Decrease passenger facility charges 3.39 1.09 44% 
 Decrease ticket prices 3.22 0.88 44% 
 Reduce lost baggage 3.56 1.04 50% 
 Increase aircraft turn-around-times 3.56 0.98 44% 
 Increase passenger safety 3.39 0.92 33% 
 Increase passenger experience 3.78 1.11 61% 
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• Benefits to airlines 
1 Due to the high fuel volume of fuel usage, consortium members pay a very low 
per gallon operation and maintenance fee. 
2 There is only one commingled facility instead of multiple tank farms and 
associated equipment. 
3 The consortium has better credit ratings than the airline which lowers the cost of 
capital. 
4 Fuel consortia can provide bond financing at a fraction of the cost of the 
individual member airlines. This can be considered as off-balance sheet 
financing. 
5 The attractive financing options of the consortium provide sufficient capital to 
invest in more modern equipment. 
6 Swapping some of the operations and management contracts of the baggage 
handling system, passenger boarding bridges and ground service equipment 
(GSE’s) saved an estimated $5,000,000. The consortium also provided a 
simplified procurement of equipment and contracts. 
7 Common facilities result in less equipment needed. 
8 Consortiums provide increased preventative maintenance which results in less 
down time. 
9 Response times are drastically improved during outages or irregular operations. 
10 The ability to choose vendors without regard to union affiliation. 
Beyond the unique characteristics highlighted above, the most significant benefit of 
consortia in regards to airline operations arises from the cost efficiencies gained from 
economies of scale. Moreover, these benefits are not just one-time productivity boosts, 
but gains that should be experienced throughout this generation of air transport. As 
ACRP Synthesis 31 displayed, most of the contracts between airline consortiums and 
their respective airports are made in perpetuity and other locales have opted to re-new 
their contracts. 
• Benefits to airports 
1 Fuel consortiums provide safeguards against inexperienced into-plane fuellers 
which reduces the possibility of spills and environmental liability. 
2 Having one facility to manage and maintain reduces the environmental risk on 
airport 
a prevents multiple fuel locations and potential for risks (environmental and 
operational) 
b allows the airport authority to more effectively manage and oversee 
environmental risk. 
3 Management and maintenance of the system, one point of contact regarding 
fuelling, reduction of vehicle activity on ramps. 
4 Fuel is a core business of airlines, not airports. Delegating this responsibility to 
consortiums allows airport authorities to focus on passengers and security. 
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5 Contracts swapped from the airport to the consortium create cheaper, faster and 
better services. Allows airport to concentrate on remaining services. 
6 Fewer operations, better equipment and usually a more responsive party 
managing them. 
7 The airport authority can invoice the consortium once instead of each airline 
separately which saves time and money. 
8 Shared liability for expenses allows the consortium to secure financing for 
common use capital projects that would otherwise have to be funded solely by 
the airport. 
• Benefits to passengers 
1 The fuel consortium can potentially benefit passengers if the airlines provide 
price relief to those passengers due to lower costs from airport operations. 
2 Decreased delays because of fuel system outages. 
3 Lower costs = lower ticket prices. More modern fuel facilities result in better 
turn times 
4 Passenger boarding bridges are rarely out of service and always returned to 
service in a short period of time. 
5 Gate, equipment and ticket counter assignments by the consortium result in an 
overall better passenger experience because of a greater familiarity and 
understanding regarding operations and passenger expectations. 
6 The consortium financed and developed a common use VIP lounge for its 
members that allowed premium passengers of the member airlines a quiet, 
comfortable place to wait for their flights. 
Contrarily, there is not much support behind the potential for these organisations to 
reduce airline ticket prices or bag fees. As this response was expected, this result is not at 
all discouraging. Prices and fees are part of the more complicated revenue management 
schemes and overall strategic directives. One should expect that competitive market 
forces will be solely responsible for any decrease in these measures. 
Table 4 Overall responses 
Overall benefit Average rating  (out of five) Standard deviation 
Percent beneficial or 
very beneficial 
Results for fuel consortia 
Airlines 4.54 0.51 100% 
Airports 4.31 0.68 88% 
Passengers 3.42 0.64 42% 
Results for terminal facility and equipment (TF/E) consortia 
Airlines 4.44 0.62 94% 
Airports 4.18 0.81 88% 
Passengers 4.00 0.77 72% 
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Additionally, recipients were also asked to express their opinion about the overall 
benefits of the consortium on airlines, airports, passengers and again to all stakeholders. 
These questions employed a similar five-point scale ranging from very harmful (1) to 
very beneficial (5). As demonstrated by Table 4, respondents looked very favourable on 
these organisations in regards to all stakeholders, although airline entities appear to 
receive the greatest benefit. 
Lastly, respondents were asked if there were currently plans to expand the 
responsibilities of the consortium at their airport location. For fuel consortia, six replied 
yes, 15 replied no. For TF/E consortia, seven replied yes, five replied no. Along the same 
lines, respondents were then asked to indicate their opinion on the potential to expand the 
consortium’s responsibilities at their airport location; 52% of respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed that the fuel consortium’s responsibilities could be increased whereas 
64% said the same about TF/E consortia. 
5 Implications 
While the uniqueness of each consortium posed difficulties for conducting an overall 
analysis, it further emphasises the versatility and adaptability of this version of  
inter-organisation cooperation. Airline-airport consortia can be engineered to meet 
virtually any specification within the airline-airport relationship spectrum whether it is 
operating a fuel tank farm, a baggage handling facility, or an entire terminal at some of 
the busiest airports in the world. 
And although the overwhelming majority of respondents cast a positive light on these 
organisations and their positive effect on stakeholders, it must be pointed out that roughly 
half of the respondents thought the consortium model would not be viable at all locations 
(50% fuel, 45% TF/E). This should not be entirely surprising, as the single greatest 
overall benefit of airline-airport consortia can be summarised as cost efficiency gains 
through economies of scale. As such, the viability of the consortium model is in great 
deal dependent on the size of the cooperative endeavour which could be expressed in 
terms of enplaned passengers, number of flights, or more importantly, the number of 
airlines operating out of the airport. This concept has been echoed by a few comments 
added by survey respondents: 
• While implementing this model is possible at most airports, the greatest benefits 
derives from consolidating costs and operations at large hub airports with 
international flights. 
• Consortiums will work at airports that have commercial presence and a long term, 
vested interest. This will most likely not work at small facilities. 
• Competition among airlines may be severe enough to prohibit explicit cooperation. 
In summation, the results of the survey have revealed strong, direct benefits to airlines 
and airports and a more modest, indirect benefit to passengers. Airline managers should 
expect the benefits achieved from economies of scale as well as reduced costs from the 
elimination of duplicate operations. Consortia are especially beneficial when there are a 
large number of airlines operating a small amount of international flights as evidenced by 
LAXFuel, BOSFuel and JFK Terminal One. Additionally, by partnering with each other 
and airport authorities, airline consortium members are able to finance development 
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projects at a lower cost of capital due to the investment grade credit ratings of the airport 
authority. 
Airport managers should be seek the benefits of a single point of contact for many 
airline issues, the transference of some operational and environmental risk, as well as the 
potential benefits of focusing on more passenger related issues. Airports should also be 
aware of a potential decrease in employee headcount as duties are transferred to the 
consortium operator and contracted parties. Furthermore, because airports are directly 
tied into state, city and municipal governments, any potential decrease of state employees 
or responsibility will be sure to have political ramifications. 
If member airlines and the airport authority can come to amicable terms on a contract 
outlining the responsibilities of each party, then all stakeholders should be able to reap 
the benefits, some more quickly than others. Passengers and potentially taxpayers, may 
eventually receive indirect benefits from this transfer of operations, but more research 
will be needed to truly evaluate this potential effect. 
6 Limitations and future research 
The greatest limitation encountered during this research effort was the lack of secondary 
data and that of a small population and subsequently, a small sample size from which to 
survey. Similarly, another limitation came as a result of a majority of responses coming 
from consortium and airport operators, although significant attempts were made to 
contact airlines as well. This resulted in a more biased and limited response in many 
areas. As mentioned above, because of the uniqueness of these organisations, it is quite 
difficult to classify consortium types to fit into mutually exclusive categories; this added 
a challenge to the questionnaire composition and the subsequent analysis. 
There are a few areas of further research which can be continued on this subject. 
Research into consortia that had been terminated was not possible. While our research 
efforts concentrated on the benefits of consortia to multiple stakeholders, disadvantages 
of consortia need further study. Airport operation efficiency should be more closely and 
quantitatively analysed to measure the true gains of the consortium model. A thorough 
analysis on improved turn-around times where consortia are present should be conducted 
to verify the responses in this survey. This study has mentioned several times that these 
consortiums possess a strong potential to indirectly increase turn-around times and  
on-time percentages but the exact or even approximate value of this metric remains 
elusive. The same holds true with respect to passenger experience and lost baggage. 
It would certainly interesting to ascertain a minimum airport size wherein competing 
airlines and the respective airport would start to experience the benefits of economies of 
scale. This is not to say the consortium model would not be successful at small airports, 
but as alluded to by survey respondents, the largest commercial airports have experienced 
the greatest benefits. 
7 Conclusions 
Expanding the body of knowledge about consortia can only benefit communal 
understanding of these types of cooperative relationships in the aviation industry. With 
multiple perspectives and influences taken into consideration, we hope that this study 
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provides some guidance on how the industry can use these viable business alternatives 
for future airline-airport relationships and, perhaps, succeed on passing some of these 
benefits to the passenger. 
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Notes 
1 According to Gee (2000), the term ‘co-opetition’ was coined by Raymond Noorda, Novell’s 
founder and former CEO, to describe simultaneous competition and cooperation between 
firms. 
